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Abstract 
This paper considers the dynamics of human capital in Russia, examining its changes over the transition 
period. A theoretical model has been developed to explain why a significant endowment of human capital 
creates the possibility but not the certainty of sustainable economic growth. An overview of the main high 
tech districts concludes the analysis. 
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1.  Introduction 
The present paper investigates the dynamics of human capital in Russia. The 
Russian  Federation  and  in  general,  Eastern  European  transition  countries  own  a 
significant stock of human capital enhanced by high levels of education. The economic 
literature postulates that a relevant stock of human capital improves the competitive 
structure of an economy, stimulates its high tech sector, and fosters economic growth. 
The evidence so far is, however, not supported by the experience of many transition 
countries, which still lag behind in terms of sustainable economic development.  
The aim of the paper is threefold. First, the human capital legacy of Russia is 
examined. Second, a theoretical model is developed to explain the evolution of human 
capital over time. Finally, an empirical investigation of the major high tech districts is 
carried out. The work is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the 
economic literature on human capital. Section 3 outlines the main features of the human 
capital  sector  in  Russia.  Section  4  provides  a  theoretical  model  of  human  capital. 
Sections 5 describes the main high tech districts in the new Russia. Section 6 discusses 
the possible policy measures to revive the human capital sector as a potential engine of 
economic growth. Section 7 concludes.  
2.  Literature Review 
The concept of human capital was originally formulated by Adam Smith (1776 
ed. 1976). In his masterpiece, the author stated that: 
 
“The  difference  between  the  most  dissimilar  characters,  between  a  philosopher  and  a 
common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, 
custom, and education. When they came into the world, and for the first six or eight years of 
their existence, they were perhaps, very much alike, and neither their parents nor playfellows 
could  perceive  any  remarkable  difference.  About  that  age,  or  soon  after,  they  come  to  be 
employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice 
of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge 
scarce any resemblance” (“The Wealth of Nations” pag19 20, Book I). 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank Prof. Antonio Aquino and Oliver Carsten Füg for helpful comments and valuable 
suggestions. I would like to express my gratitude to an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier 
version of the paper. 104 
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Afterwards,  the  theory  on  human  capital  was  formalised  by  Schultz  (1961), 
Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974, 1988). The basic idea of the human capital theory is 
that  the  variety  of  talents  is  mainly  acquired  through  different  activities,  such  as 
education or working experience. These activities have a cost, but produce benefits in 
future. In simple words, human capital acquisition is an asset (Mincer, 1993). 
Becker (1964) discusses the formation of human capital through the working 
experience at specific firms or working places. Workers become more productive and 
qualified over time thanks to “learning by doing” processes, and as a consequence, their 
wages  will  tend  to  increase.  On  the  supply  side,  workers  are  aware  that  their 
competences and skills are firm specific and therefore, the same wage level will be not 
guaranteed if they move to a different firm. On the demand side, employers tend to 
hold  the  most  productive  workers  in  their  firms  by  keeping  wages  and  working 
conditions high. Remuneration and other non monetary aspects of jobs become, in the 
author’s view, a powerful tool used by firms to reduce turnover costs. Both workers and 
firms have thereby incentives to maintain long run relationships, when investments in 
education and job formation take place. 
Like  Becker,  Romer  (1986)  speaks  about  “learning  by  doing”  processes,  but 
unlike Becker, Romer introduces the term “knowledge” as engine of economic growth. 
This is a side product of the production activity, and augments with work. Moreover, 
knowledge is a public good, non rival and non excludable. Therefore once it has been 
acquired it spills over across the whole economy generating a sustainable economic 
development.  
The most representative model of human capital in the growth literature was 
elaborated by Lucas (1988). In his two sectors model, the author points out that human 
capital  and  knowledge  are  synonyms  and  are  a  voluntary  outcome  of  the  learning 
process. Based on his theoretical setting, some authors of the new growth literature 
(Mankiw et al. 1992; Barro and Sala i Martin 1997; Acemoglu and Angris 1999; Krueger 
and Lindhal 2001) have empirically proved that the stock of human capital plays an 
extremely important role in promoting economic growth and prosperity (Mankiw et al., 
1992). 
Since  their  vast  pools  of  human  capital  and  high  educational  achievements2 
inherited from the Soviet era, Eastern European and CIS countries were expected “to 
exploit their comparative advantage in skill intensive manufacturing and in high tech 
goods and to create significant intra industry trade both among the Eastern European 
countries themselves and between East and West” (CEPR’s Report, 1990). 
Hamilton and Winters (1992) emphasised the high probability of convergence 
between the present EU members, Eastern Europe and Russia in terms of per capita 
income levels: “these countries might grow at some 2% faster than the EU.” 
3.  The Soviet Union Legacy 
Two  singular  features  characterised  the  former  Soviet  Union.  Firstly,  its 
industrial sector was unable to produce commodities of good quality and to offer strong 
incentives  for  workers  and  management.  Natural  resources  were  misallocated:  the 
significant comparative advantage in the natural sector, in fact, fizzled out going from 
resource  extraction  to  refined  and  processed  goods  (Russian  Academy  of  Sciences, 
2000; Intriligator et al. 2001). 
                                                 
2 See Rutkowski 1996, 1998; Gros and Suhrcke 2000; Micklewright 1999; UNICEF 2000, 2001, 2003  
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Secondly, the former Soviet Union was a leader in different technology fields 
such  as  metallurgy,  precision  instruments,  space  technologies,  computer  software, 
aircraft  building  and  development  of  new  materials.  In  line  with  the  international 
standards,  the  former  Soviet  Union  gained  a  significant  level  of  development  in 
transport and infrastructure sectors, mass education and in the basic applied research. 
This progress relied on the valuable science establishment and broad networks between 
research  institutes  and  experimental  laboratories  coordinated  at  national  level 
(Intriligator et al. 2001).   
The high quality of human capital was mainly achieved by ensuring that the 
labour  force  had  a  high  level  of  general  education.  Moreover,  the  planned  system 
offered  a  peculiar  scheme  of  non market  incentives  (mainly  in  the  form  of  a  high 
standard of living) to the Russian intellectual elite. Scientists and researchers, therefore, 
could benefit from a high social status, several fringe benefits and higher wages than 
those paid to the rest of the economy. In the early 1990’s, Russia had 200 university and 
college students per 10,000 of population, a value which is similar to most developed 
countries. About 20% of workers had a university degree, whilst less than 3% had not 
graduated  from  high  school.  In  1985  Russia  alone  employed  more  than  1.2  million 
research workers and more than 3 million people, if specialists are considered (Pomer, 
2001, Micklewright 1999).  
The  new  Russia  inherited  from  the  former  Soviet  Union  two  areas  of 
comparative  advantage,  one  in  the  resource  extraction  sector  and  the  other  in  the 
human capital sector. While the first area of advantage has already made great strides in 
the world  market,  the  second  one  does  not  keep  pace with  international standards. 
Indeed Russia is a net importer in the sectors which make intensive use of human 
capital (Tab.1, appendix B). More precisely, the specialisation index calculated for 2002 
(Tab.2, appendix B) shows that the only human capital intensive products in which 
Russia is specialised are optical instruments, non electric engines and steam generating 
boilers. 
 
3.1 Evolution of the Two Russian Comparative Advantages 
 
The second half of 1989, with the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of 
many communist governments, brought about dramatic developments and accelerated 
the dismantlement of the communist system in the former Soviet Union3 and in Central 
and  Eastern  Europe. The  Russian  economic  transition  from  a  planned  to  a  market 
economy started with a drastic reform program  a ‘Big Bang’  launched by president 
Boris Yeltsin after October 1991.  
This  reform  program,  the  so called  “shock  therapy”,  envisaged  a  quick 
liberalisation, a massive privatisation and a fast stabilisation programme for the Russian 
economy.  The  shock  therapy  was  aimed  at  making  irreversible  the  economic  and 
political transformation of the Russian Federation. In few months, central controls were 
outlawed, price and trade barriers were lifted and a colossal privatisation agenda started. 
The immediate effect of this was an increase in the price level and an upsurge in the 
                                                 
3  The  Soviet  Union  was  a  compound  of  fifteen  Union  Republics,  twelve  of  them  –Russia,  Belarus, 
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Kyrgyzstan– have signed an alliance in 1991 and have set up the Commonwealth of Independent 
State (CIS). The other three Baltic Republics  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania   instead, have gained 
independence from each other and declined to join the CIS. 106 
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inflation rate. In the first three years of the radical reforms, real GDP dropped by 33 
percent,  industrial  production  by  44  percent  and  investments  by  60  percent 
(Goskomstat, 2005; Pomer, 2001). Over the next four years, albeit at a slower rate, the 
economic  decline  continued  and  the  rouble  appreciated.  Government  expenditures, 
including spending on human capital (science, education, culture, and health care), fell 
to 37.8 percent of GDP in 1996 and to approximately 35 percent in 1997 (The World 
Bank, 2001). Relative to 1990, employment in 1998 was off by 11 million workers, 
poverty became endemic, and social services were halved. The Russian privatisation 
process brought a small group of people, the so called “oligarchs”, to grab a sizeable 
part of the public wealth, and as a consequence, inequality increased and mafia influence 
became prominent in several aspects of Russian life (Glinkina et al. 2001). 
The predictions of the proponents of the shock therapy about an economic 
recovery of Russia within two years of the Big Bang turned out wrong. It took eight 
years  for  the  country  to  register  the  first  signs  of  revival, with  the  first  year  of  an 
increase in GDP and an upturn in exports materialising only in 1999. 
In the new Russia, natural resources are the most intensively exploited assets and 
occupy a central place in the economy. In 2005, Russia’s real gross domestic product 
(GDP)  grew  by  6.4%, marking  the  country’s  seventh  consecutive year  of  economic 
expansion (BOFIT, 2006). Russia’s recent economic growth has been fuelled primarily 
by energy exports, particularly given the boom in Russian oil production4 and relatively 
high world oil prices during the last seven years. But this type of growth has made the 
Russian economy dangerously dependent on oil and natural gas exports, and especially 
vulnerable to the risk of “the Dutch disease” (Algieri, 2004). Although estimates vary 
widely, the World Bank has suggested that the oil and gas sector may have accounted 
for up to 25% of GDP in 2003 – while employing less than 1% of the population. 
By contrast, the situation in the human capital intensive sector, Russia’s second 
area  of  comparative  advantage,  is  gloomy.  The  country's  high tech  sector  was 
particularly affected by the economic turmoil of the 1990s, with research institutes and 
scientific centres undergoing a severe crisis due to doleful underfunding, and their staffs 
often obliged to survive thanks to foreign grants and moonlighting. Other scientists 
simply changed professions or emigrated. Investments into new technology were also 
very sluggish, since neither the developing private sector nor the financially strapped 
government was able to provide the funding necessary to finance the high tech sector. 
(The  Moscow  Times,  January  13,  2005).    Moreover,  during  the  first  years  of  the 
transition, the public expenditure on education declined by 55% in real terms, while the 
growth in private expenditure did not offset the drop in public funding (Intrilligator, 
2001). A study conducted by UNICEF provides evidence of the significant slumps in 
education expenditure in Russia ( 33%) and other transition countries between 1989 and 
2001 (Tab. 3).  
Public expenditure on basic science dropped even more intensely. The Russian 
gross domestic expenditure on R&D, expressed as percent of GDP, shrank from 2% in 
1990 to between 0.7 and 0.8% in the mid 1990's, remaining under 1% until the end of 
1998, before rising to 1.24% in 2002 (OECD, 2004). Such values are far below those 
recorded in EU countries, USA and Japan (Tab.4, appendix B). To elicit the relation 
between R&D activities as percent of GDP and per capita GDP in 2002, an estimation 
                                                 
4 In 2004, Russia was the world’s second largest producer of crude oil, second only to Saudi Arabia (EIA, 
Top World Oil Producers, 2006) and in 2005 Russia’s production of oil with gas condensate reached 
470,2 million tons, up from 11,2 million in 2004 (Transneft, 2006).   
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using the OLS technique has been employed. The sample includes 29 countries. Data 
have been collected from OECD and IMF databases.  
 
Table 3. Changes in public expenditure on education in real terms, 1989-2001. 
   Fall in real education 
expenditure (per cent) 
Hungary   22 
Slovakia   31 
Russia   33 
Latvia   45 
Lithuania   47 
Kyrgyzstan   71 
Bulgaria   75 
Azerbaijan   77 
Georgia   94 
 
        Source: UNICEF 2003 
 
The estimation shows that there is a significant, positive relationship between the two 
variables  (Fig.1).  An  increase  in  the  GDP  of  10%  brings  about  a  rise  in  the  gross 
domestic  expenditure  on  R&D  of  about  8.6%.  Furthermore,  the  graph  shows  how 
considerable the gap is between Western and Eastern countries. 
 
Fig. 1 R&D activities as % of GDP and per-capita GDP in 2002 
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3.2. Characteristics of the R&D sector in Russia 
 
The gross domestic expenditure on R&D in Russia is mainly financed by the 
government  (about  55%).  Other  sources  of  finance  are  the  Russian  industry  (about 
33%),  foreign  aids  (12%)  and  other  national  financial  supports  (0.4%)  (Tab.5  a, 
appendix B). These data differ from those of the other considered countries, where 
industry  mainly  finances  the  R&D  sector.  A  country  similar  to  Russia  in  terms  of 
consistent public contributions to the R&D sector is Italy (Tab.5 a, appendix B).  
The Russian activities in R&D are performed mostly by the business sector and 
by the government. The first aspect is common to the other considered countries, while 
the latter applies only to Italy. The private non profit research sector is almost absent in 
Russia and completely absent in Italy and Germany (Tab.5 b, appendix B).  To have a 
clear picture of the distribution of R&D among manufacturing sectors, the quotas of the 
Russian total business enterprise expenditures on research and development have been 
calculated. Most of the Russian R&D efforts are devoted to machinery and aerospace 
branches, with quotas respectively bigger than 30% and 20% on the total expenditures. 
A significant amount of research is then addressed to motor vehicles and TV, radio and 
communication  equipment.  Concerning  the  “new  technology”  sector,  the  electrical 
machinery registers increasing quotas, while the electronic computing and office and 
computer machinery show until 1997 declining trends (Tab. 6, appendix B). 
The  R&D  sector  in  the  new  Russia  is  characterised  by  declining  wages.  In 
October 1997 the share of workforce being paid below the official poverty line was 49% 
for  the  education  sector,  31.6%  for  the  research  sector  and  17.5%  for  the  entire 
industrial  sector  (Ushkalov  and  Malaha,  1999).  According  to  Nezavisimaya  Gazeta 
(2002), a high level of pessimism spread among the Russian intellectual elite due to the 
consistent cuts in salaries and in the federal budget allocated to research centres. This in 
turn caused a drop in the number of researchers per 1000 workers in the labour force 
between 1994 and 2002 (OECD, 2004) (Fig. 2, appendix B) and an intense “brain drain” 
phenomenon. The outflows of human capital from Russia total more than 1 million 
people  over  the  past  14  years  (EIU,  2004).  A  large  number  of  emigrants  are  well 
educated people who formed the core of Russia’s intellectual capital. The intellectual 
elite migrated to the United States, Canada, Germany, Israel and other countries. In the 
last ten years, about 13,000 Russian scientists have settled in Israel (Stone, 1999). The 
chairman  of  the  unions  represented  at  the  Russian  Academy  of  Sciences,  Viktor 
Kalinushkin, said that Russian scientists and programmers in the USA were responsible 
for developing 30% of Microsoft products (BBC News, 20 June, 2002). In addition, the 
number  of  temporary  emigrants,  i.e.  researchers  and  intellectuals  who  leave  their 
country  for  short term  or  medium  term  contracts,  exceeds  the  number  of  officially 
recorded cases of migration (EIU, 2004). 
4.  Low Human Capital Profile and Low Technology Trap Model 
An extended version of the Redding model (1996) has been used to explain why 
human capital creates the possibility, but not the certainty of economic growth. The 
model, which  accounts  for  all  the  aforementioned  characteristics  of  Russian  human 
capital, is well suited to explain the dynamics of the human capital sector. 
A detailed description of the model is provided in Appendix A. The amended 
model  incorporates  the  “brain  drain”  factor,  a  variable  that  has  not  been  used  by  
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endogenous growth theorists, but that turns out to be a key determinant in explaining 
the pattern of economic growth in the case of Russia. 
The model proves that, given a certain human capital profile, an economy can 
reach three types of growth equilibrium: a high growth, a low growth and a mixed 
growth equilibrium. The large endowment of human capital in Russia has not led to 
high growth. Indeed, in the Russian transition, incentives and conditions to boost any 
form of human capital based industry were missing. The human capital itself, hence, had 
little choice but mass emigration.  
Specifically, Russia did not have an environment prone to encourage innovation 
and risk taking policies. The government’s attention was not directed towards the value 
of research, the provision of crucial services, the supply of efficient communications or 
the development of transport and other business infrastructures. It is well known that 
companies  investing  domestically  or  internationally  seek  not  only  new  and  enlarged 
markets, but also simple rules on business start up and operation, and clear, consistent 
and reliable regulations (OECD, Observer, 1999). But in Russia, all these basic elements 
did  not  exist.  Furthermore,  the  poor  living  conditions  of  scientists  dissuaded  many 
young people to start a scientific career and motivated established researchers to pursue 
careers abroad. 
Since the existing firms were not profitable, any investment in R&D, technical 
innovation, work place organisation and market knowledge was superfluous over the 
transition. Besides, there was no support for improvements of vocational and technical 
training, and the government failed to promote mobility between vocational/technical 
and traditional academic studies.  
To survive and flourish in a scientific and technological environment, firms have 
to re organise and become more adaptable to changes. They need to build trust and 
liability;  they  also  need  flexibility  and  durable  networks  as  a  fundamental  part  of 
maximising value added  in  output.  Small  units  have always characterised  the  service 
sector,  and  in  recent  years  the  manufacturing  sector  of  the  most  rapidly  growing 
economies has registered a decrease in average firm size over time. One rationale for the 
success  of  smaller  businesses  is  their  capacity  to  adjust  swiftly  to  new  situations. 
Although individually they may be subjected to more upheavals in their life cycles than 
larger firms, jointly they are essential creators of new employment. In addition, they 
generate  significant  spillovers  of  ideas  and  innovation.  In  Russia,  however,  the  role 
played  by  small  and  medium  sized  enterprises  is  still  very  small  measured  by 
international standards (Russia Profile, 2005). 
This range of factors, together with the need to promote a business friendly 
regulatory  environment,  is  essential  to  guarantee  the  development  of  an  advanced 
technological sector. In this context, the Russian human capital legacy alone is not a 
sufficient condition to create sustainable growth, it tends naturally to depreciate if not 
properly cultivated. Measures aimed at limiting the cuts in firms’ R&D and in education 
and halting the brain drain phenomenon should be enhanced by policy makers to avoid 
the risks linked to the low growth trap (Barro and Sala i Martin, 1995). The challenge, 
therefore, becomes both to recover the lost potential and to develop commercial outlets 
for scientific output. 
5.  Information Technology in Russia 
Against the scenario of the low growth trap, a number of development in the 
human capital sector seem to be materialising in the new Russia. A first impression is 110 
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that the high tech sector is taking first steps towards resuscitation by making use of the 
massive technological research infrastructure and the highly educated work force (Fig. 3, 
appendix B). Some areas in Russia might be compared to the Italian industrial districts. 
Moscow and St. Petersburg in the Western part of Russia, and Novosibirsk in Siberia 
constitute the most important high tech cities for manufacturing plants and the best 
development centres of offshore software. Nevertheless, deeper considerations should 
be done on these high tech clusters. 
The following paragraphs present a more detailed look at the major high tech 
districts, against which some conclusions for policy development are drawn. 
 
5.1 Siberia’s Silicon Valley: Novosibirsk 
 
Novosibirsk, a Siberian town of more than 1.5 million people, has been dubbed 
“Siberia’s Silicon Valley” by The Moscow Times, thanks to its high concentration of 
software  companies  and  talented  programmers.  The  heart  of  high tech  business  is 
located, in fact, in this town. The local computer industry started in the late 1980s and 
was  based  at  the  Novosibirsk  State  University  and  the  Novosibirsk  State  Technical 
University. Immediately, two “computer streets”, Morskoi Prospect in Academgorodok 
(a  suburb  of  Novosibirsk)  and  Marx  Prospect  in  downtown  Novosibirsk,  were 
developed. About 25 computer companies are located in this area.  
 
The  sales volume  of  legal  software  in  Novosibirsk  is  estimated  to  be  up  to 
500,000 US$ per month in 2002. This value, which does not include sales of offshore 
programming, has increased almost by 50% since 1999. 
 
  Tab. 6 Sales volume of legal software in Novosibirsk, US$ per month 
1999  2000  2001  2002 
350000  400000  410000  500000 
 
The main types of software sold are: 1) accounting and production automatic 
systems (e.g. 1C, Best, Parus Predpryatic) (53% of sales); 2) software and laws reference 
systems  (e.g.  Consultant  Plus,  Garant,  and  Codex)  (22%  of  sales);  3)  corporate 
information systems (e.g. Oracles Applications, Parus Korporatsia) (10% of sales); 4) 
operational systems office and internet applications (10% of sales) and 5) programs for 
multimedia and games (5% of sales). 
Two American companies, Microsoft and Oracle, are active in the local software 
market. Microsoft holds up to 90% of the market in operational systems and office 
applications. Oracles holds 30 40% of the market in corporate information systems. 
Most of the software companies are involved in the new offshore programming 
business  which  generates  a  market  size  of  US$250  million  per  year.  The  biggest 
company is Novosoft. It has been furnishing offshore programming to foreign, mostly 
US  based  companies  since  1992. Another  local producer  is  the  Centre  of  Financial 
Technologies  (CFT).  CFT  specialises  in  developing  and  selling  a  popular  banking 
software named "Golden Crown". The system is supplied to more than 200 banks in 
Russia and in NIS countries. The company developed an automated payment system 
called “Gorod (City)”, which is designed to collect payments from the local population 
for municipal services. Another important project involves the implementation of an 
electronic trade system called Faktura.  
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At a first glance, it could appear quite odd that a town in Siberia has become so 
important on the high tech scene. There are, however, a number of good reasons to 
explain why the city has turned into a “district” with a highly developed IT market. 
Because of its geographical location and a well structured transportation infrastructure, 
Novosibirsk matured in a commercial centre outside of “European” Russia. Computer 
hardware and software are supplied to a huge number of Siberian regions from the city. 
The  intense  concentration  of  high quality  programmers  and  scientists  fostered  by 
Novosibirsk  State  University  and  low  labour  costs  create  opportunities  for  local 
software companies to be competitive in software market along with Moscow and St. 
Petersburg.  
 
5.2 Moscow Offshore Software Market 
 
Moscow accounts for about 35% of Russia's offshore software development 
market which makes it the number 1 software outsourcing centre in the country. A 
substantial scientific base, as in the other two high tech towns, fuels the city’s software 
sector. Several major universities that train programmers as well as a few major research 
institutions are located in the city. Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute, Bauman 
State Technical University, Moscow State University and Moscow Institute of Physics 
and Technology have in fact, a reputation for turning out highly qualified specialists. 
International IT majors often create educational centres on the campuses of Moscow 
institutes to get access to talent as soon as possible. For instance, the Moscow Technical 
University of Communications and Informatics supports training quarters from Alcatel, 
Cisco and Ericsson. The number of experts in IT fields who graduate every year is 
about  5000 5500.  Besides,  approximately  16000 18000  graduates  in  different 
engineering areas who have a deep background in IT can be employed as programmers 
every year (Outsourcing Russia, 2001). 
According to most estimates, about 70 Moscow based software firms work on 
overseas orders, with the total number of employees being close to 4,000, and with 
about 1,000 programmers. The total value of the Moscow offshore software market is 
estimated at $70 75 million a year.  
International  markets  where  Moscow  suppliers  are  active  include  the  USA, 
Germany, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, France, Japan, Spain, Canada, South 
Korea, Poland, and Netherlands. The leading companies in the districts are the Spirit 
Corporation, Epsam Systems and Luxoft. The Spirit Corporation is one of the main 
developers  of  telephony  software  who  provides  its  services  to  global  firms  like 
Panasonic,  Samsung  Electronics,  Texas  Instruments,  Nortel  Networks  and  other 
telecom companies. EPAM Systems develops software in several areas, including sales 
force  automation  solutions,  data  warehousing,  work flow  management,  legacy 
integration  solutions,  enterprise  information  portals,  e commerce  and  warehouse 
management. The customers of EPAM Systems include Colgate Palmolive, Halliburton, 
Samsung America, Danfoss, West Group, Verizon, Park Place Entertainment, and the 
Mandalay Bay Resort Group, and the company also implements software development 
orders  from  established  international  IT  giants,  such  as  SAP,  Microsoft,  PTC, 
ServiceWare,  Firepond,  IntelliCorp  and  Numerix.  Luxoft's  main  focus  is  on  the 
development of applications for business processes and integration of new software into 
existing programs. Forty percent of Luxoft's customers are IT companies, about 30% 
aerospace companies, and the remaining 30% are made up of finance and insurance 112 
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groups. Among its international customers are the US Department of Energy, Zurich 
Financial  Services  Group,  IBM,  Boeing  and  Citibank.    About  80%  of  all  software 
development orders come from overseas customers. Although 80% of overseas orders 
are  accounted  for  by  US  customers  and  the  company  has  offices  in  Seattle  and 
Washington DC, it is also looking closely at other markets, considering the opening of 
an office in Europe, where most of the remaining customers are located (Outsourcing 
Russia, 2002). Luxoft grew by 48% between 2004 2005 (Luxoft, 2006) and this growth 
is expected to continue.  
 
5.3 St. Petersburg   
 
St. Petersburg is the second largest city in Russia in terms of population, political 
influence,  financial  and  industrial  strength.  Many  consider  St. Petersburg  the 
technological and cultural capital of Russia. Developed infrastructure and geographical 
proximity  to Western  Europe  give  St.  Petersburg  a  cosmopolitan character. A  large 
proportion of imports and exports from/to Scandinavian countries and Finland goes 
through the transport hubs of the city, reaffirming the city’s pronounced orientation 
towards Western trading partners. 
Since  2001,  more  than  200  software  development  companies  operate  in  St. 
Petersburg, 20% of which have access to international markets.  The companies hire 
between 10,000 and 25,000 programmers. The maximum hourly wage of a programmer 
is $20 compared to $120 in the U.S. This can feasibly contribute to profit margins of 
300 800% on finished software products. 
There  are  three  types  of  software  developers  currently  operating  in  St. 
Petersburg:  software  divisions  of  large  international  companies;  developers  offering 
specialized,  proprietary  software;  and  outsourcing  companies  offering  their 
programmers for specific tasks (offshore software development).   
The software development market in St. Petersburg is growing by 50% annually. 
This is chiefly due to the educational institutions providing a pool of specialists and 
access to a comparatively cheap labour force.  
The  first  look  at  the  Russian  districts  is  positive  and  the  perspectives  of 
development  seem stimulating. The picture is however less rosy than it appears. Firstly, 
the development of the high tech sector is still in its infancy and limited to the domestic 
level5. Secondly, the technology clusters are largely controlled by foreign enterprises, 
notably  American  ones.  Thirdly,  the  talented  professionals  tend  to  concentrate  in 
attractive locations: Moscow, a sophisticated metropolis; St. Petersburg, heart of culture 
and art, and Novosibirsk, a place of natural, recreational and lifestyle amenities, distant 
from the nuisances of the Russian industrial core. Owing to the high quality of these 
surroundings,  it  is  not  surprising  that  a  community  of  talented  researchers  stays  in 
Russia, although their salary is far below international standards. If the conditions of 
these research environments could be extended to the whole of Russia, it is likely that 
fewer scientists would choose to move abroad. In reality, however, most of the new 
Russia remains characterized by poor living conditions, inexistent property rights, and 
low level quality social services, ranging from heat and housing to urban transport and 
public safety. 
                                                 
5 The primary domestic end users of IT are: governments (Federal and State levels); public institutions; 
finance institutions; state and private enterprises; computer equipment manufacturers and individuals. 
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6.  Remarks and Some Policy Implications 
While  Russia  is  exploiting  its  comparative  advantage  in  the  natural  resource 
sector, it has left largely unexploited its potential in the human capital intensive sectors 
and their possible development. Russia's long term potential as a leader in information 
and advanced technologies has been continuously ignored by policy makers, technical 
advisors and international investors who have instead focused on the traditional sectors 
of the Russian economy, mainly on heavy and extractive industry. And even the positive 
signs emanating from the “high tech districts” might be of short duration without a 
proper support strategy. 
One of the main obstacles to the development of the high tech sector is thus the 
lack  of  a  consistent  government  policy  aimed  at  preserving  Russia’s  human  capital 
endowment and avoid its depreciation. But as government expenditure on fundamental 
research remains scanty and often inefficiently allocated, rent seeking activities tend to 
increase. 
Another relevant problem is linked to the general insecurity of property rights, 
especially in intellectual property, in the Russian economy which prevents domestic and 
foreign investment in the human capital sector. Currently property rights and business 
deals are guaranteed and enforced by corrupted private groups and fraudulent insiders. 
At the same time, relations among economic agents rest on tacit rules which often are 
the result of a criminal threat. Investors therefore cannot and do not risk investing their 
money in long term business ventures in Russia because they do not perceive to be 
sufficiently protected by the legal infrastructure. As a consequence, many Russian firms 
that carry out projects in the high tech sector prefer to locate all of their non production 
activities outside of Russia.  
Many of the policy measures that Russia needs to revive its human capital pool 
and  to  promote  the  IT  sector  are  also  measures  that  are  necessary  to  endorse  the 
development  of  the  entire  Russian  economy.  Necessary  interventions  include  the 
creation of market institutions and the formulation of responsible government policies 
(Braguinsky  and  Yavlinsky,  2000).  To  this,  a  range  of  specific  measures  aimed 
particularly at the IT and other knowledge intensive sectors has to be added in order to 
achieve lasting development. For example, contacts and access to global markets should 
be boosted, capital access and financing mechanisms should be fostered and a social 
capital approach to economic development should be created. Furthermore, protection 
of shareholder rights, good accounting regulations, and the institutional structures are 
important elements to develop an entrepreneurial culture in Russia. With these measures 
in place, Russia could move to the forefront of the information revolution and take a 
leading place in the world economy. It would no longer be just a supplier of oil and gas, 
minerals, raw materials, and arms. At the same time, it would no longer be a nation 
dependent on the support of other nations and international public and private banks. 
Rather, Russia could diversify its export mix by adding in high technology products and 
thereby create a broader and stronger basis for economic growth.  
The main efforts in providing conditions for the successful exploitation of the 
comparative advantage in the Russian knowledge based industries will have to come 
from the Russian authorities themselves by providing adequate information and the 
appropriate  institutional  framework  for  those  who  would  like  to  make  use  of  this 
potential. The situation today is highly unusual. It is extremely hard for an ordinary 
businessman to get reliable information as to what kind of research is indeed available, 
who  has  property  rights  to  it,  and  how  it  can  actually  be  commercialised.  The 114 
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government should assist in creating a database, or ensure that relevant information is 
made publicly available by other means. Given that most research has been carried out 
and is still being carried out in military related institutions, failure of the government to 
take  an  active  role  in  disseminating  information  about  this  research  will  render  its 
commercial exploitation very difficult indeed.  
It should be noted that President Vladimir Putin has recognised the importance 
to diversify the Russian economy and to develop the nation's high tech industry. He 
therefore announced an ambitious plans to expand the high tech sector by use of tax 
incentives for investors in special economic zones, saying that the country “must not 
miss  this  chance”  to  catch  up  with  its  competitors  in  international  markets  (The 
Moscow  Times,  January  13,  2005).  The  construction  of  Russia's  first  information 
technology park officially began at the end of April 2006 in St. Petersburg. Covering a 
total area of 44 hectares, the IT park will call for about $1 billion worth of investment 
and it should start operating in 2008 or 2009 (The Moscow Times, April 25, 2006). 
Surprisingly, the high tech cluster of Novosibirsk has been excluded from the project. 
7.  Conclusions 
Nowadays, human capital intensive industries are drawing worldwide attention, 
mainly  in  the  Information  Technology  (IT)  sector.  Owing  to  its  abundant,  yet 
underutilised human capital and to the world’s largest pool of scientists and engineers, 
Russia has relevant potentialities in IT and knowledge based development. If properly 
fostered, Russia’s human resource intensive sector could lead to the revival of the whole 
economy and promote its integration in the world market.  
The Russian Federation enjoys a double benefit in the information technology 
sector.  Firstly,  Russia  owns  a  massive  technological  research  infrastructure  inherited 
from the Soviet Union. Secondly, there is a highly educated work force to encourage IT 
innovation. With such a significant base of expertise, Russia could become a major 
centre for computer software development similar to India. The reason why Russia still 
lags behind can be described by an extended version of the Redding model (1996), 
according to which economic growth is generated by attendant investments in R&D and 
education.  Since  expenditure  on  R&D  and  education  have  been  cut  during  the 
transition, it is clear that Russia’s per capita GDP does not match the potential inherent 
in  its  human  capital  endowment.  Indeed,  the  deterioration  in  the  quality  of  human 
capital is likely to have adverse effects in the long run. The only way to overcome this 
problem is to adopt policy measures which will boost the human capital intensive sector 
, while at the same time strengthening the rule of law and market incentives. 
Recently there have been symptoms of recovery in the Russian market for IT 
related products. Until 1997, there was a contained demand for engineers and technical 
professionals, who either had to work for meagre wages, change job or emigrate. Since 
the aftermath of the August 1998 crisis, firms in the computer, mass communications, 
and IT industries have been actively employing new personnel and are offering quite 
attractive salaries by Russian standards. A typical programmer with experience earns 
between  $8,000 $14,000  per  year,  depending  on whether  the  location  is  high priced 
Moscow or the cheaper provinces. That's a little more than the $ 7,000 to $11,000 an 
Indian might make, but it is well below the $55,000 or more paid to an American in a 
similar job (Global Outsourcing, 2005). 
The major IT districts are located in Moscow, St. Petersburg and in Novosibirsk, 
but the situation of these high tech clusters is less rosy than it seems. In fact, the IT  
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districts are still at their infancy stage and de facto colonised by foreign companies, 
whose  contributions  to  develop  and  expand  Russia’s  technological  potential  have 
remained modest. It will thus depend crucially on Russian policy makers whether these 
developments can be shaped into a sustainable driver of growth to the benefit of the 
Russian economy and society at large. 
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Appendix A 
Low Human Capital Profile and Low Technology Trap Model 
Russia  is  supposed  to  be  populated  by  a  sequence  of  non overlapping 
generations  (g) with  a  two period  lifetime  (τ  =1,2).  Generations are  composed  of  a 
continuum of workers (e) and firms (f). Population has been normalised so that each 
generation consists of exactly two agents: a worker and a tycoon.  
The representative worker, who is assumed to be risk neutral, has the standard 
linear utility function: 
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where cτ,g is the consumption of generation g in period τ and ρ is the subjective 
time preference rate, that is it measures the individual’s impatience to consume. Each 
individual inherits a stock of human capital from the former generation, as postulated by 
Lucas (1988), so that: 
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where δ is the human capital depreciation rate across generations and H2,g 1 is 
the  aggregate  period  2  stock  of  human  capital  of  the  generation  g 1.  Workers  can 
improve their period 2 human capital by investing part of period 1 in education and 
schooling. More precisely, they devote a fraction η of period 1 to education, such that 0 
≤  η  ≤1.  The  remaining  fraction  (1   η)  is  instead  employed  for  production.  It  is 
furthermore assumed that period 2 is entirely devoted to production. 
To take into account “brain drain” effects, we postulate that period 2 stock of 
human capital of the g generation depends both on a fraction η time spent in education 
and on the permanence of workers in their country. Formally: 
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where parameters γ and φ indicate education productivity. It is assumed that if a 
worker invests in education, the worker’s human capital will indeed grow by factor γ, 
according to an exponential rate φ. β is a parameter which identifies the “brain drain” 
effect. In particular, β is zero, if well educated people do not leave their country, β is 
equal to 1, if paradoxically, all high skilled people migrate. The inter temporal human 
capital spillovers across generations, as predicted by Lucas (1988), are positively linked 
to human capital accumulation in period 2, i.e. the higher the inherited stock of human 
capital (1.2), the more productive investments in human capital will be (1.3). 
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Firm’s decisions  
Each firm (f) has the classical Cobb Douglas production function that exhibits 
constant returns to physical and human capital: 
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where At,g is the productivity factor or the technology’s quality employed by 
firm f in period t. ht,g and kt,g denote, respectively, the period t human and physical 
capital of the representative worker employed by firm f .  
Firms decide whether to invest a fraction c of period 1 output in costly R&D. cI 
is the effective fraction of time necessary to get a research facility, with 0£ cI £1. If the 
fraction c ³ cI of period 1 is spent on research, a firm successfully innovates with 
probability P=p such that 0< p <1. Conversely, if the fraction c < cI of period 1 is 
spent on research, a firm successfully innovates with probability P=0. 
Let us assume that the starting technology quality is A0= 1, while A1,g= Z n 
describes technology growth with n= 0……..ň (where ň is the finite highest technology) 
and Z >1. Put differently, technology’s quality or productivity depends on the number 
of  innovations  (n)  and  it  grows  exponentially  with  this  number,  with  Z  being  a 
parameter which specifies the technology growth.  
According to Acemoglu (1994) and Redding (1996), the economy has a level of 
full employment and workers and firms are randomly matched one to one. The returns 
to a  match are divided between the worker and the tycoon at an exogenous fixed rate, ξ 
and (1  ξ) respectively. Firm f pays the period t wage per unit of human capital to its 
employee: 
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In period 1, all firms have the same technology. On the one hand, workers have 
to make an expectation regarding the innovation of the firm and their future wage and, 
as a consequence, they decide upon the time to allocate to human capital improvements. 
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On the other hand, each firm has to decide whether to carry out research (case 
1) or keep on implementing the existing technology (case 2). In the first case, the firm 
defines the fixed fraction cI of the first period to spend on R&D, given the innovation 
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0  and it expects returns on R&D (R (r&d)) according 
to equation 1.7. 
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In the second case, the expected return of the firm is R (0): 
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A  firm  engages  in  research  if  R  (r&d) R  (0)>0  and  this  condition  depends 
strongly on the employees’ expected period 1 investment η in human capital.  
Behaviour of Workers 
The representative worker (e) living in two –periods  maximise his utility  
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subject to the inter temporal budget constraint: 
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where the first term expresses the period 1 wage and the second addendum is 
the present value of the expected wage according to eq.1.6. Under the risk neutrality 
assumption, the inter temporal optimisation problem of the worker consists of choosing 
the  proper  η  that  maximises  the  expected  discounted  lifetime  income.  Therefore, 
substituting  the  expressions  for  h1,g  ,  h2,g  and  wt,g  in  the  budget  constrain,  the 
problem can be written as follows: 
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Considering just the interior solution 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, it is clear, from equations 1.5 
1.13  and  1.14,  that  the  investments  of  workers  in  education  rely  strongly  on  the 
expected firms’ investment in R&D. Formally: 
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with ηπ > η0. 
 
 
 
Nash Equilibrium 
 
In a game theory framework, the Nash equilibrium solution has been obtained 
using  equations  (1.7)  (1.8)  (1.15).  A  Nash  equilibrium  is  a  certain  kind  of  rational 
expectation equilibrium, which consists of probability beliefs over strategies and the 
probability of choosing strategies such that: 1) the beliefs are corrects and 2) each player 
chooses strategies so as to maximise his expected utility given his belief.  In this context, 
tycoons make investments before entering the labour market and before knowing the 
decision of the workers to invest in human capital, but conjecturing on it (eq. 1.7, 1.8). 
Equally, for employees: their total and marginal returns from investing in human capital 
depend on whether they expect the firm to invest in R&D (eq.1.15). Since the two types 
of investment are, in Redding’s words, “strategic complements” and show monetary 
externalities, and since research technology is indivisible, three possible equilibria exist: a 
high growth, a low growth and a mixed growth equilibrium. 
In a high growth equilibrium, workers expect that the firm will engage in R&D 
and since they suppose they will earn higher wages, they will invest in human capital. In 
turn,  a  higher  expected  stock  of  human  capital  increases  the  expected  returns  on 
research and therefore firms will raise their investment in R&D. R&D is optimal if  
 
R (r&d)   R (0)> 0 
 
That is, we require: 
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By explicating the above equation and rearranging it, we get: 
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According to 1.18, to have a “high growth equilibrium” is necessary that: 
1.  the probability of successful innovation π is high; 
2.  the technology growth parameter Z is high; 
3.  the subjective time preferences rate ρ is small; 
4.  the fixed cost parameter χI is small; 
5.  the amount of time devoted to education η is high; 
6.  the education productivity parameters γ and θ are large; 
7.  the migration parameter β is very small. 
In a low growth equilibrium, the firm does not consider it profitable to carry out 
R&D and the only source of growth is human capital accumulation. At the same time, 
workers, expecting a drop in firms’ R&D, trim down their investments in human capital. 
At this stage of human capital accumulation, the workers expectations are met as the 
returns  from  investing  in  further  R&D are  lower  than  the  returns  gained  using  the 
existing technology. 
The low growth equilibrium implies that P=0 and η=η0. In this case, no R&D is 
an optimal solution if it holds R (r&d) R (0) <0. This means:  
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The high growth equilibrium (1.18) is characterised by a high accumulation of 
human capital, a high amount of R&D and thus, high quality technology and no brain 
drain. The low growth equilibrium (1.19) is instead characterised by no research, a low 
accumulation of domestic human capital and migration. Equations 1.18 and 1.19 might 
hold simultaneously, therefore a multiple equilibrium exists: 
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 While the high and low growth equilibria are stable, the simultaneous ones not.  
 
The  presented  model  extended  to  the  Russian  case  shows  that  a  large 
endowment of human capital does not ensure economic growth. It is necessary that 
investments in human capital, investments in R&D and incentives for the workforce 
exist in order to reach a high growth equilibrium. Therefore, the human capital legacy of 
Russia is a necessary but not sufficient condition to have sustainable growth. When 
expenditures on education drop, R&D declines and brain drain effects occur, it is more 
probable that the economy will finish in a bad equilibrium. Hence measures aimed at 
preventing the cuts in R&D and education and arresting the brain drain phenomenon 
should be endorsed by policy makers to avoid the threats linked to the low growth trap. 
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Appendix  B 
 
Table 1. Exports and Imports of the Russian Federation 
Exports  Value 
1997 
Value 
1998 
Value 
1999 
Value 
2000 
Value 
2001 
Value 
2002 
Value 
2003 
Value 
2004 
   US$ 
'000 
US$ 
'000 
US$ 
'000 
US$ 
'000 
US$ 
'000 
US$ 
'000 
US$ '000  US$ 
'000 
751   OFFICE MACHINES   11,889  6,534  5,871  4,775  5,937  8,126  12,070  13,287 
752   COMPUTER 
EQUIPMENT  
41,495  44,677  66,114  37,988  27,077  68,023  41,896  60,345 
759   OFFICE EQUIP 
PARTS/ACCS. 
14,979  10,322  8,937  14,600  4,188  12,111  9,803  12,835 
761   TELEVISION RECEIVERS   1,597  2,332  8,682  2,705  12,654  1,416  3,128  9,097 
762   RADIO BROADCAST 
RECEIVER 
2,412  3,309  0,785  1,352  1,069  1,122  1,427  1,075 
763   SOUND/TV RECORDERS 
ETC  
6,106  9,323  2,301  2,050  1,578  1,591  2,153  3,088 
764   TELECOMMS 
EQUIPMENT NES  
347,643  175,442  219,085  131,417  174,947  202,779  283,119  401,923 
773   ELECTRICAL DISTRIB 
EQUIP 
97,307  94,849  78,39  112,881  136,039  113,354  136,089  176,560 
774   MEDICAL ETC EL DIAG 
EQUI 
5,836  6,367  5,689  33,732  10,950  11,785  11,072  24,625 
781   PASSENGER CARS ETC   406,919  315,971  206,625  349,459  298,659  351,878  395,866  558,338 
782   GOODS/SERVICE 
VEHICLES  
163,.314  145,605  109,946  133,675  289,414  465,253  397,611  521,424 
783   ROAD MOTOR 
VEHICLES NES  
29,156  32,732  33,584  37,459  58,424  80,203  98,894  141,611 
792   
AIRCRAFT/SPACECRAFT/ETC  
698,089  603,614  101,419  166,392  319,297  380,665  2,819,752  769,349 
793   SHIPS/BOATS/ETC   998,689  1008,46  724,192  987,195  387,503  442,430  349,361  543,277 
871   OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS 
NES  
44,202  49,372  41,067  39,799  36,504  48,089  68,631  57,987 
872   MEDICAL/ETC 
INSTRUMENTS  
16,888  15,298  16,766  17,996  22,406  22,981  32,809  36,834 
881   PHOTOGRAPHIC 
EQUIPMENT  
22,957  11,330  7,678  4,404  5,130  4,921  3,577  4,252 
882   PHOTOGRAPHIC 
SUPPLIES  
7,655  4,681  4,738  3,964  3,971  3,522  5,447  6,044 
884   OPTICAL FIBRES   16,095  13,402  38,203  41,106  31,512  19,798  20,195  26,369 
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1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
   US$ '000  US$ '000  US$ 
'000 
US$ 
'000 
US$ '000  US$ '000  US$ '000  US$ '000 
751   OFFICE MACHINES   72,264  41,531  27,372  29,105  51,387  42,887  49,204  67,745 
752   COMPUTER 
EQUIPMENT  
279,931  181,346  185,891  202,444  412,516  528,581  607,811  968,627 
759   OFFICE EQUIP 
PARTS/ACCS. 
140,781  92,617  61,780  61,536  69,102  115,267  147,296  191,323 
761   TELEVISION RECEIVERS   170,117  55,266  38,751  29,784  144,012  153,126  103,715  204,105 
762   RADIO BROADCAST 
RECEIVER 
21,494  9,519  2,211  16,512  73,387  133,812  148,660  240,040 
763   SOUND/TV RECORDERS 
ETC  
56.226  20,465  12,207  17,456  45,319  71,349  79,841  238,041 
764   TELECOMMS 
EQUIPMENT NES  
1,573,115  1,170,255  723,482  802,617  1,169,980  1,446,784  1,552,908  2,481,847 
773   ELECTRICAL DISTRIB 
EQUIP 
226,590  208,960  105,280  117,828  135,938  156,931  186,847  301,907 
774   MEDICAL ETC EL DIAG 
EQUI 
449,266  510,226  338,571  205,048  433,049  360,842  465,328  457,073 
781   PASSENGER CARS ETC   993,993  825,572  304,316  443,298  951,688  1,288,829  2,460,645  5,163,769 
782   GOODS/SERVICE 
VEHICLES  
329.491  217,031  108,469  155,146  323,590  293,122  419,802  497,345 
783   ROAD MOTOR 
VEHICLES NES  
466,720  286,107  114,697  142,422  199,186  263,761  311,510  475,946 
792   
AIRCRAFT/SPACECRAFT/ETC  
   9,284  12,348  16,351  115,143  210,477  324,184  229,109 
793   SHIPS/BOATS/ETC   846,963  657,779  446,746  221,209  285,207  299,914  246,190  154,835 
871   OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS 
NES  
9,402  15,200  14,271  9,122  14,778  23,076  45,012  45,086 
872   MEDICAL/ETC 
INSTRUMENTS  
424,245  438,924  214,572  234,661  389,229  311,568  479,545  521,977 
881   PHOTOGRAPHIC 
EQUIPMENT  
63,313  28,659  8,353  13,395  17,394  26,016  24,169  32,350 
882   PHOTOGRAPHIC 
SUPPLIES  
143,210  85,320  79,805  89,908  95,471  98,452  106,603  114,685 
884   OPTICAL FIBRES   52,424  35,108  26,511  35,810  42,476  39,702  49,946  61,571 
Source: International trade center, 2006  
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 Table 2. Inter-Industry Specialisation Index 
Russia  2002     2002 
Inter industry 
specialisation 
   De specialisation    
247   WOOD IN 
ROUGH/SQUARED  
25,391.86  782 – GOODS/SERVICE VEHICLES   91,60 
672 – PRIMARY/PRODS 
IRON/STEEL 
23,363.73  792   AIRCRAFT/SPACECRAFT/ETC   84,59 
562   MANUFACTURED 
FERTILIZERS 
19,285.53  034   FISH,LIVE/FRSH/CHLD/FROZ  81.73 
343   NATURAL GAS   9,125.08  641   PAPER/PAPERBOARD   79.93 
683   NICKEL   8,623.62  654   WOVEN TEXTILE FABRIC NES  76.11 
282 – FERROUS WASTE/SCRAP   7,211.14  281   IRON ORE/CONCENTRATES   58.42 
248   WOOD SIMPLY WORKED   6,336.96  716   ROTATING ELECTR PLANT   48.27 
334   HEAVY PETROL/BITUM 
OILS  
5,386.85  722   TRACTORS   47.07 
333   PETROL./BITUM. 
OIL,CRUDE 
4,825.18  613   FURSKINS TANNED/DRESSED   46.90 
325   COKE/SEMI 
COKE/RETORT C  
2,805.95  773   ELECTRICAL DISTRIB EQUIP  45.13 
673   FLAT ROLLED IRON/ST 
PROD 
1,152.98  635   WOOD MANUFACTURES N.E.S.  44.89 
682   COPPER   1,150.91  793   SHIPS/BOATS/ETC   34.53 
686   ZINC   1,061.38  612   LEATHER MANUFACTURES   34.02 
684   ALUMINIUM   956.94  621   MATERIALS OF RUBBER   30.62 
712   STEAM/VAPOUR 
TURBINES  
857.00  842   WOMEN/GIRL CLOTHING 
WVEN 
29.63 
232   RUBBER 
SYNTH/WASTE/ETC  
842.58  322   BRIQUETTES/LIGNITE/PEAT   29.53 
512   
ALCOHOLS/PHENOLS/DERIVS  
613.44  884   OPTICAL FIBRES   28.28 
321   COAL NON 
AGGLOMERATED  
496.79  841   MENS/BOYS WEAR, WOVEN   22.11 
211   HIDE/SKIN (EX FUR) RAW   403.75  122 – TOBACCO, MANUFACTURED   21.59 
611 – LEATHER   374.93  657   SPECIAL YARNS/FABRICS   20.27 
671   PIG IRON ETC FERRO 
ALLOY 
329.98  724   TEXTILE/LEATHER MACHINRY  19.03 
522   ELEMENTS/OXIDES/HAL 
SALT 
262.19  737   METALWORKING MACHINE 
NES 
17.23 
676   IRON/STEEL 
BARS/RODS/ETC 
260.19  658   MADE UP TEXTILE ARTICLES  16.69 
678   IRON/STEEL WIRE   254.94  721   AGRIC MACHINE EX TRACTR   15.99 
871   OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS 
NES  
164.17  723   CIVIL ENGINEERING PLANT   15.42 
714 – ENGINES NON 
ELECTRIC NES 
111.86  781   PASSENGER CARS, ETC   15.11 
711   STEAM GENERATING 
BOILERS 
106.18  666   POTTERY   14.43 
      541   PHARMACEUT EXC 
MEDICAMNT 
14.39 
      783   ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES NES   14.32 
      751   OFFICE MACHINES   13.53 
      848   HEADGEAR/NON TEXT 
CLOTHG 
13.04 
      741   INDUST HEAT/COOL EQUIPMT  13.00 
      881   PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT   11.79 
      744   MECHANICAL HANDLING 
EQUI 
9.95 
      001   LIVE ANIMALS EXCEPT FISH  9.65 
      752   COMPUTER EQUIPMENT   8.88 
      112   ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES   8.67 
      764   TELECOMMS EQUIPMENT NES   8.22 
      812   SANITARY/PLUMB/HEAT FIXT  8.09 
      759   OFFICE EQUIP PARTS/ACCS.  6.88 
      851   FOOTWEAR   6.28 
      653   MAN MADE WOVEN FABRICS   6.00 
      553   PERFUME/TOILET/COSMETICS  5.31 
      872   MEDICAL/ETC INSTRUMENTS   4.32 126 
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      725   PAPER INDUSTRY MACHINERY  3.69 
      726   PRINTING INDUSTRY MACHNY  3.32 
      583   MONOFILAMENT RODS/STICKS  2.72 
      846   CLOTHING ACCESSORIES   2.08 
      882   PHOTOGRAPHIC SUPPLIES   2.03 
      774   MEDICAL ETC EL DIAG EQUI  1.82 
      763   SOUND/TV RECORDERS ETC   1.55 
      727   FOOD PROCESSING MACHINES  1.34 
      762   RADIO BROADCAST RECEIVER  0.72 
      761   TELEVISION RECEIVERS   0.53 
      012   MEAT NES,FRESH/CHLD/FROZ  0.09 
      011   BEEF, FRESH/CHILLD/FROZN  0.00 
Source: Own calculations on ITC data. 
 
Note: The index is the ratio between the Balassa index (1965) calculated for 
exports and the Balassa index for imports. Formally it is given by: 
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where xki refers to the exports of commodity k by country i and mki to the imports of 
commodity k by country i. The numerator represents the share of commodity k in the 
exports  of  country  i  relative  to  the  share  of  commodity  k  in  world  exports.  The 
denominator  represents  the  same  relative  share  for  imports.  By  considering  the 
normalised  quotas  of  exports  and  imports,  this  indicator  ostensibly  provides  an 
unbiased measure of specialisation, as well as an unbiased predictor of the intensity of 
comparative  advantage.  Values  above  100  indicate  the  presence  of  comparative 
advantages. 
 
 
Table 4. International gross domestic expenditure on R&D as % of GDP. 
   Russia  Germany  Italy  Japan  USA  EU 15  China 
1992  0.74  2.4  1.18  2.89  2.65  1.87  0.74 
1993  0.77  2.33  1.13  2.83  2.52  1.86  0.72 
1994  0.84  2.24  1.05  2.77  2.43  1.82  0.65 
1995  0.85  2.25  1  2.9  2.51  1.8  0.6 
1996  0.97  2.25  1.01  2.78  2.55  1.8  0.6 
1997  1.04  2.29  1.05  2.84  2.58  1.8  0.68 
1998  0.95  2.31  1.07  2.95  2.6  1.81  0.7 
1999  1  2.44  1.04  2.96  2.65  1.86  0.83 
2000  1.05  2.49  1.07  2.99  2.72  1.88  1 
2001  1.16  2.51  1.11  3.07  2.74  1.92  1.07 
2002  1.24  2.52  ..  3.12  2.67  1.93  1.23 
2003  ..  2.5  ..  ..  2.62  ..  .. 
Source: OECD, Science and Technology, 2004. 
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Fig. 2 Total researchers per 1000 labour force. 
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Table 5. % Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (2003) 
a) financed by 
   Government  Private 
sector 
Other national 
sources 
Abroad 
Russia  58.40%  33.10%  0.40%  8.1% 
Usa  31.20%  63.10%  5.70%  0% 
Japan  18.20%  73.80%  7.60%  0.40% 
Germany  32.10%  65.10%  0.40%  2.40% 
Italy  50.80%  43.60%  0.60%  5% 
Total 
OECD 
29.90%  62.30%  4.80%  3.00% 
 
 
b) performed by 
   Government  Private 
sector 
High education 
sector 
Private no profit 
sector 
Russia  24.50%  69.90%  5.40%  0.20% 
Usa  9.10%  68.90%  16.80%  5.20% 
Japan  9.50%  74.40%  13.90%  2.20% 
Germany  13.80%  69.10%  17.10%  0% 
Italy  22%  52.80%  25.20%  0% 
Total 
OECD 
11%  68%  18.10%  2.90% 
Source: OECD, 2004 
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Table 6. Russian total business enterprise expenditure quota on R&D 
   1995  1996  1997 
machinery n.e.c.  32.95  30.60  32.21 
aerospace  19.09  22.74  23.68 
moto vehicles  7.82  8.75  8.76 
Tv, radio & communication 
equipment 
6.03  5.98  5.91 
chemical products  6.27  5.64  4.79 
ships  7.02  7.61  4.14 
other transport equipment  1.59  2.85  3.89 
electrical machinery  2.54  2.66  3.45 
electro. comp  4.24  3.23  2.66 
instruments  2.98  2.46  2.24 
basic metals, non ferrous  2.33  1.51  1.51 
basic metals, ferrous  1.06  0.50  1.46 
coke, ref. petrol. prod & nuclear 
fuel 
1.29  1.39  1.36 
rubber & plastic products  0.79  0.72  0.95 
fabricated metal products  0.64  0.63  0.57 
non metallic mineral products  0.93  0.45  0.61 
pharmaceuticals  0.77  0.89  0.49 
pulp, paper & paper products  0.26  0.14  0.32 
food, beverages and tobacco  0.28  0.23  0.15 
leather products  0.05  0.08  0.15 
textiles  0.21  0.13  0.14 
office, account & computing  0.37  0.24  0.12  
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machinery 
furniture  0.06  0.05  0.06 
wearing apparel & fur  0.02  0.01  0.06 
recycling  0.14  0.26  0.03 
publ. print. & repro. of rec. media  0.14  0.20  0.20 
other manufacturing  0.08  0.04  0.01 
wood & cork  0.04  0.02  0.10 
total manufacturing  100  100  100 
 Source: own calculations on OECD data. 